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BOOK REVIEW
AGAINST JUDGMENT
Katherine Y. Barnest
AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN
ACTUARIAL AGE. By Bernard E. Harcourt. Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press, 2007. Pp. 336. $25.00.
INTRODUCTION
In his seminal work, Against Method, Paul Feyerabend argued that
the scientific method was an inadequate way to gain knowledge.'
Feyerabend preferred anarchistic science-science without rules
about how to proceed in the quest for knowledge. 2 He argued that
the scientific method was too regimented and prescribed to allow for
learning about the infinite complexity of the natural world. 3 With a
nod to this influential work, Bernard Harcourt's Against Prediction: Pro-
filing, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age challenges the use of
actuarial methods in the criminal justice system. 4 In this provocative
and innovative book, Harcourt argues that prediction has serious flaws
and, more importantly, warps society's view of justice by focusing
solely on justice that is quantifiable. Against Prediction seeks to rede-
fine the debate in criminal justice from how society uses actuarial
methods to whether society should use those methods at all. Harcourt
answers this second question, as the title of his book suggests, in the
negative-he argues that society should not use prediction in criminal
justice. While Against Prediction falls short of redefining the debate, its
criticism of actuarial methods provides a compelling critique of crimi-
nal justice decision making.
t Associate Professor and Director of the Rogers Program in Law and Society, Uni-
versity of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. I would like to thank David Adelman
for lively discussions of Against Prediction and for pointing me to Paul Feyerabend's work. I
would also like to thank Nicholas Kasirer and John Hobbins, Dean and Law Librarian of
McGill Law Faculty, respectively, for providing me with an office and library privileges dur-
ing the summer of 2007. Finally, I would like to thank Bernard Harcourt for writing such a
thought-provoking book.
1 PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: OUTLINE OF AN ANARCHISTIC THEORY OF
KNOWLEDGE (Verso 1978) (1975).
2 See id. at 17.
3 See id. at 18.
4 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING
IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007).
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Initially, Harcourt focuses his arguments on the use of prediction
in the criminal justice system. He defines actuarial predictions as
"criminal justice determinations that do not rest simply on probabili-
ties but on statistical correlations between group traits and group
criminal-offending rates."5 In particular, Harcourt focuses on three
prediction scenarios: profiling in investigation, sentencing systems,
and parole board decisions. 6 Harcourt's arguments can be summa-
rized as: first, while actuarial methods "work" in a limited sense, they
often have unintended consequences, and therefore relying on pre-
dictions results in flawed and often counterproductive policy deci-
sions;7 and second, by focusing solely on prediction, society ignores
anything that it cannot measure and allows the measurement thresh-
old to control what it finds important." Despite Harcourt's careful
narrowing of his argument to prediction in the criminal justice sys-
tem, his arguments against prediction extend to other contexts. Two
examples suffice to make this point. First, for environmentalists,
many of Harcourt's criticisms will sound familiar, as they map directly
onto arguments criticizing cost-benefit analysis and the economiza-
tion of the environment.9 Second, in the field of medical diagnosis,
some critics believe that the impulse to control or conquer a disease
leads to excessive healthcare costs and overtesting, which generates
poorer results than those produced by either the traditional tools of
diagnosis or the targeted use of a smaller number of tests. 10 Thus,
while Harcourt limits his discussion to the criminal justice context, his
arguments extend well beyond this arena and have important conse-
quences in a wide range of policy settings.
Against Prediction provides three central criticisms of the use of
actuarial methods in the criminal justice system. Harcourt first chal-
lenges the argument that actuarial methods are efficient by demon-
strating that profiling can lead to significant inefficiencies in many
situations.11 Second, Harcourt assails the selective incapacitation ar-
gument favoring actuarial methods by arguing that it results in funda-
mentally unfair outcomes. 1 2 Third, Harcourt argues that actuarial
methods warp society's view ofjustice by causing society to abjure the
responsibility of determining what is just-actuarial methods focus
5 Id. at 18.
6 See id. at 77-107.
7 See id. at 110-44.
8 See id. at 173-92.
9 See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004).
10 See, e.g., MALcoLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING
(2005).
11 See HARCOURT, supra note 4, at 111-14.
12 See id. at 145-72.
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solely on the portion of 'justice" that can be measured. 3 Harcourt
concludes Against Prediction by proposing to eliminate the use of actua-
rial methods, which he argues is the only way to avoid the pitfalls of
prediction. ' 4
Part I of this Book Review outlines Harcourt's three criticisms
against prediction and discusses how these criticisms interrelate. Part
II focuses on Harcourt's solution to the prediction problem and il-
luminates an implicit theme running throughout Against Prediction,
namely, Harcourt's distrust of human judgment in the predictive deci-
sion-making context. Part III further considers the use of actuarial
methods in criminal justice and outlines an alternative solution to the
serious flaws that Harcourt uncovers.
I
HARCOURT'S THREE CRITIQUES OF PREDICTION
Before beginning his critique of actuarial methods, Harcourt
frames Against Prediction with a fascinating description of the rise of
actuarial methods in the criminal justice system. As his primary exam-
ple, he highlights the use of predictive instruments to determine the
likelihood of repeat offenses following parole. ' 5 To modern readers,
these instruments are little more than validations of stereotypes; hav-
ing categorized individual prisoners according to personality types
such as "Farm boy," "Ne'er-do-well," and "Mean citizen," the sociolo-
gist-actuary simply looks up the probability of reoffending for a partic-
ular personality type and uses this probability to determine whether
parole is appropriate for such a prisoner.1 6
It is easy to dismiss this early use of prediction as misguided at
best and bigoted at worst. Such amorphous categories are not used
today because reliability and validity of categorization are too impor-
tant.17 But lest modern actuaries become too complacent about the
advanced state of prediction today, Harcourt reminds us that recent
practice in devising predictive instruments remains spotty at best. For
example, in the 1970s, California adopted a parole-prediction instru-
ment that explicitly relied on race as one of four factors. 18 More fun-
damentally, Harcourt uncovers two flaws in arguments supporting
prediction analysis that he considers fatal: the first implicates the effi-
ciency argument, 19 and the second undermines the selective incapaci-
13 See id. at 173-92.
14 See id. at 237-39.
15 See id. at 47-76.
16 See id. at 56-59.
17 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. Riv. 1, 83-97
(2002) (describing the importance of reliability and validity of coding in empirical work).
18 See HARCOURT, supra note 4, at 72.
19 See id. at 22-26.
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tation argument.20 Having demonstrated significant flaws in the
justifications for prediction, Harcourt's third critique demonstrates
how prediction invidiously alters society's sense of justice, providing
an additional argument for eliminating prediction in the criminal jus-
tice system.21
A. The Efficiency Argument: Elasticities Matter
In his discussion of economic efficiency, Harcourt assumes the
role of the insider. Arguments that use the master's tools to tear
down his house are appealing but difficult to achieve. Harcourt does
not quite tear down efficiency as an argument for predictive methods,
but he does make a strong case that the model on which the argu-
ment rests is inadequately narrow.
The economic efficiency argument assumes a rational choice
framework-individuals will decide when and whether to commit
crimes rationally, based on the likelihood of their being caught and
their expected punishment.22 Changing the expected punishment
(for example, via parole decisions) or the likelihood of apprehension
(for example, via profiling) should change the behavior of potential
criminals and therefore change crime rates.23 The efficiency argu-
ment also assumes that police and other actors in the criminal justice
system act rationally. 24 For example, police will choose whom to stop
and search in order to maximize their own goals within cost con-
straint. 25 In a rational choice framework, therefore, defining the
goals of the police and potential criminals in turn defines their
actions.
In the context of racial profiling, which Harcourt explores in
great depth, economists John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra
Todd (KPT) provide the leading model of profiling. In their article
Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, KPT outline a
rational choice model of profiling that differentiates between efficient
20 See id. at 26-31.
21 See id. at 31-34.
22 See id. at 112-13.
23 See id. at 113 ("[T]he economic model of racial profiling predicts that police of-
ficers will target the higher-offending group (minorities), for police searches because they
will achieve better hit rates for their stops and searches. Profiling the higher-offending
group and searching them disproportionately, however, will increase the cost of offending
for members of this higher-offending group and thus eventually reduce their rate of of-
fending. As the search rate of minority suspects increases, for instance, their payoff for
transporting contraband will decrease, so that fewer minority suspects will carry
contraband.").
24 See id. at 112.
25 See id. at 112-13.
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profiling and profiling motivated by racial animus. 26 The key point of
the KPT model is that individuals and police officers update their be-
havior-ultimately, their behavior converges to equilibrium. 27 As
KPT describe their model: "[S] uppose that searching one subgroup of
motorists yielded a higher return. Then police would always search
these motorists, who would in turn react by carrying contraband less
often, until the returns to searching are equalized across groups."28
Harcourt argues that the KPT model and, more generally, the
efficiency rationale for predictive methods ignore the elasticities of
criminal offending. 29 Elasticity of criminal offending measures how
an individual who is contemplating whether to commit a criminal of-
fense reacts to a small change in policing strategy.30 More formally, it
is the normalized ratio of the change in crime rate given a small
change in police strategy (e.g., increasing searches for young black
men). 31 Harcourt proves that police can counterproductively in-
crease the total amount of crime while acting "rationally" by using
profiling. As Harcourt shows, the KPT model and the test of racial
animus based thereon are only efficient under certain situations, de-
pending on the relative elasticities of the profiled group and the ig-
nored group.3 2 This is a powerful critique of the leading economic
model of profiling. Harcourt explains how using the best current pro-
filing techniques actually increases crime in a variety of situations.33
Harcourt astutely stresses that elasticities matter when determining
whether profiling is efficient-because we know little about the elas-
ticities of different groups in relation to changes in the level of appre-
hension, it is difficult to discern whether profiling is efficient.34
However, Harcourt's emphasis on elasticities is not a devastating
critique of rational choice theory or of economic models in general.
The KPT model fails to minimize crime not because it ignores elastici-
ties but because minimizing crime is not the goal of the police in the
KPT model. In an earlier work, Harcourt made this point more force-
fully,35 but here it is more of a side note; for KPT, the goal of the
26 SeeJohn Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theoy and Evidence, 109
J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001).
27 See id. at 206.
28 Id.
29 See HARCOURT, supra note 4, at 123.
30 See id. at 23.
31 See id.
32 See id. at 125-27.
33 See id. at 125-32.
34 Indeed, even Harcourt's simple model assumes that elasticities within groups are
uniform. However, there is little reason to believe that every potential criminal within a
targeted group will react the same to changes in police strategy-one would expect hetero-
geneous elasticities.
35 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil
Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L.
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police is to maximize the percentage of searches in which contraband
is found and not to minimize crime.36 Harcourt's critique forcefully
points out that these two goals often lead to different results. His cri-
tique is also a reminder that police should have the goal of reducing
crime. While Harcourt's reminder may seem unnecessary, police may
respond to the more immediate payoff of finding contraband given
the difficulty of measuring the effect of policing on the crime rate.
Foreshadowing Harcourt's third critique, the problem is that an effec-
tive crime-reduction strategy encompasses more than merely those at-
tributes capable of measurement. By focusing solely on maximizing
the percentage of successful searches, police make decisions based on
what they see in an individual police-citizen contact rather than on
the wider scope of what happens when the police are not watching.
Hit rates are the police officers' measuring stick of performance in
the KPT model precisely because they can be measured.
B. The Selective Incapacitation Argument: A Ratchet Effect
Harcourt next criticizes prediction methods for creating what he
terms a "ratchet effect. '37 The ratchet effect is easiest to understand
in the prototypical racial profiling arena. Assume that the police stop
and search young black men at a higher rate than they stop and
search other motorists under the theory that black men are more
likely to be drug dealers. This results in the overrepresentation of
young black men among drug dealers caught by police as compared
to the underlying population of drug dealers. Police then rely on
these data of positive hits to allocate future resources-they update
their profile based on the current data, which already overrepresents
young black men. In round two of profiling, the police stop and
search young black men at even higher rates, claiming to do so be-
cause the data point them in that direction. This process repeats and
the overrepresentation of the targeted group-young black men-in-
creases each time the police update their profile. This is the
"ratchet"-the one-way lever that increases the level of scrutiny police
impose on young black men without questioning whether the data
upon which the profile relies are skewed in any way.
REv. 1275, 1281 (2004) ("[T]he new economic models and the debates over 'policing effi-
ciency' are maximizing the wrong thing: instead of maximizing the success rate of searches,
the police should seek, first and foremost, to maximize the reduction in the profiled crime
and associated policing costs-in other words, to minimize the social costs associated with
the profiled crime and profiling technique. As a result, the new economic models track the
wrong statistic: rather than focusing on hit rates, the models should focus on the overall
amount of profiled crime and costs to society of the searches.").
36 See HARCOURT, supra note 4, at 123.
37 See id. at 147.
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Harcourt's ratchet-effect critique attacks the selective incapacita-
tion argument supporting actuarial methods. The selective incapaci-
tation rationale argues that the best way to lower crime rates is to
incapacitate individuals most likely to commit crimes. 38 In an era of
scarce crime prevention resources, the argument goes, it is wise to
focus on individuals likely to commit the largest number of crimes.t -
The ratchet effect, as Harcourt acknowledges in a subsequent essay, is
neither consistent with rational behavior nor justified by rational
choice theory.40 If potential criminals were rational, they would alter
their behavior when faced with a higher likelihood of being caught
(due to increased searches against the targeted group) and would
choose not to commit crimes. Then, assuming the police engage in
rational behavior as well, they would break the one-way ratchet and
decrease the oversampling of the targeted group. The ratchet effect
also assumes imperfect information-people rely on poor statistics
without recognizing, or fully accounting for, biases in the data.4 1 This
critique highlights and foreshadows Harcourt's final critique, which
focuses on the way that data shape our perceptions.
Harcourt's first two arguments are fundamentally about poor pre-
diction methods that police should abandon even though they may be
the best methods currently available. But an alternative view is that
Harcourt's first two arguments simply suggest that a lot of people use
prediction poorly-even with such imperfect methods, one could do
better by recognizing their shortcomings when using them. The
ratchet effect depends on police implementing policy based on slavish
reliance on biased data; the efficiency argument fails when police
maximize the factor they can measure easily (hit rates) rather than
minimize the factor people care about (total crime rates). Neither of
these serious flaws in current practice is fatal, and both can be amelio-
rated, if not completely eliminated. The ratchet effect simply requires
police to acknowledge the biased sample from which their data de-
rives and limit the use of biased data; even better would be for the
police to use an unbiased sample. 42 Fixing the efficiency problem re-
quires being able to measure the effect of policing on different popu-
38 See id. at 145.
39 See id. at 147.
40 See Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader's Companion to Against Prediction: A Reply to Ariela
Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir on Economic Modeling, Selective Incapacitation, Govern-
mentality, and Race 12-13 (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 350
(2d series), Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 175, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=1007073.
41 See HARCOURT, supra note 4, at 156 (noting the "paucity of reliable information on
natural offending rates").
42 The use of an unbiased sample foreshadows both Harcourt's solution to the predic-
tion problem, see id. at 237-39, and my own solution, see infra Part III.
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lations. Harcourt seems to assume that these are insurmountable
obstacles. 43
Given Harcourt's third critique of actuarial methods, I am wary of
offering the hope that actuarial methods simply need to be im-
proved-that if we properly measure the important variables, the pit-
falls of prediction will disappear. 44 Harcourt would likely accuse me
of falling into the seductive trap of prediction, where the goal-to
know the criminal-is doomed to fail. This is Harcourt's third, and
most powerful, critique of actuarial methods.
C. The Measurement Critique
Finally, Harcourt argues that relying on prediction alters society's
sense of justice in invidious ways. As Harcourt writes, "What we have
done, in essence, is to displace earlier conceptions of just punishment
with an actuarial optic. Today, the criminal sentence is related, pri-
marily, to prior criminal history as a proxy for future offending .... 45
In essence, Harcourt argues that society has allowed what it can mea-
sure to govern what it should know. To the extent that society has al-
lowed this to happen-and I have no doubt that it has-Harcourt's
illumination of the problem is an important insight.
But Harcourt sees the problem as more than just measurement.
He describes the issue as the misplaced desire to understand "the
criminal" and to determine how the criminal mind works in order to
control criminal impulses and to make the rest of society safe. 46 This
desire must remain unfulfilled because it is impossible to know people
completely or to control situations fully. Harcourt argues that this de-
sire leads us to value only measurable aspects of the criminal mind.47
Valuing only what is measurable is not an inevitable consequence
of using actuarial methods. While the impulse to value only what one
can measure may be strong, good actuaries build models based on
initial decisions about what is important and modify those models
based on what is measurable while retaining the humility to under-
stand that their models are flawed.48 Thus, being cognizant of a given
model's flaws and how those flaws affect its analysis is important. That
people overuse prediction is not a problem with prediction but a
43 See Harcourt, supra note 40, at 4.
44 Despite being wary, I propose a method to do exactly this in Part III. I recognize,
however, that no method is perfect and admit that the data and methods proposed are not
a panacea for all the problems with prediction.
45 HARCouRT, supra note 4, at 188 (emphasis omitted).
46 See id. at 174.
47 See id. at 180.
48 As George Box, a famous statistician, once said: "Essentially, all models are wrong,
but some are useful." GEORGE E.P. Box & NOPLAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING
AND RESPONSE SURFACES 424 (1987).
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problem with human judgment. Indeed, taken individually or com-
bined, none of Harcourt's critiques of prediction are fatal. Each cri-
tique has a solution that can be summed up succinctly: recognize the
limitations of prediction.49
II
JUDGMENT AS THE KEY PITFALL OF PREDICTION
Harcourt lays out his solution to the prediction problem in the
final chapter of the book, which comprises a mere three pages, after
236 pages of text critiquing prediction. Perhaps Harcourt meant the
final chapter to be an initial exploration, rather than a robust discus-
sion, of randomization, but his description does not warn the reader
of this limited discussion. This, however, is the quibble of a reader
who was tantalized by hints of a solution to the thorny problem of
prediction and the three critiques that Harcourt levels against it.
Harcourt's solution is bold: he argues that we should forego all
prediction. 50 Harcourt does not, however, endorse returning to a
preprediction world where individual human judgment, with all its
flaws and biases, formed the basis for decisions. Instead, Harcourt
moves to the opposite extreme and argues that complete randomiza-
tion 51 is the only way to avoid the pitfalls of prediction. 52 If Harcourt
had simply believed that the costs of actuarial methods outweigh their
benefits, he could have argued for a clinical model of decision making
where probability models provide a framework within which people
exercise judgment or, like Feyerabend, argued for no method at all.53
Both choices avoid the pitfalls that Harcourt illuminates. 54 By advo-
cating randomization, Harcourt tips his hand; he is not against predic-
tion per se but the human judgment involved in prediction. By using
randomization, he does not avoid the pitfalls of prediction but rather
the pitfalls of human judgment-of using statistics poorly, blindly,
and without giving thought to the deeper ramifications of their use.
49 In many complex contexts, actuaries understand this point. Financial markets, bus-
iness consulting, and, in some cases, medical diagnosis are three fields in which judicious
use of actuarial methods has yielded positive results. These examples are very different
from the criminal justice system, but it may be useful to determine the structural differ-
ences between these contexts, where individuals appropriately use prediction, and the
criminal justice system, where using prediction has led to disastrous results.
50 See HARCOURT, supra note 4, at 237 ("The only way to achieve our ideal of criminal
justice is to avoid actuarial methods and to police and punish color-blind, gender-blind, or
class-blind. To police and punish, in essence, prediction-blind").
51 I use the phrase "complete randomization" to mean that decisions would be ran-
dom and would not use predictive models.
52 See HARCOURT, supra note 4, at 237.
53 See FEVERABEND, supra note 1.
54 Of course, each choice also has different drawbacks.
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Harcourt simply does not trust fallible people to make decisions using
actuarial methods.
Harcourt defines his randomization solution as "(1) using ran-
dom sampling in police practice and (2) eliminating the use of pre-
dictions of future dangerousness in postconviction processes. '55 The
details of Harcourt's randomization solution, however, remain hazy in
Against Prediction.56 His definition of randomization does not de-
scribe, for example, where to implement randomization; one assumes
that all decisions should be randomized. Randomizing all decisions is
impossible, however, because human judgment must exist at some
point in the process. Consider stops and searches on the highway.
Who do the police stop and search? Which highway(s) should they
patrol? How often? How many resources should police allocate to
patrolling versus investigating "more serious" crimes? What is a "more
serious" crime? At the very least, a person has to create the
randomization program. Indeed, other attempts to tame human
judgment have invariably left that judgment intact while merely shift-
ing it to other outlets. The great, recent example of such shifting is
the enactment of the federal sentencing guidelines, through which
Congress intended to rationalize and tame the judgment of federal
judges. But with the judges' discretion curtailed, the human judg-
ment of other actors in the system-the sentencing commission and,
most importantly, prosecutors-increased in importance. 57 Prosecu-
tors now largely control sentencing outcomes through their charging
and plea bargaining practice. 58 Simply put, it is impossible to eradi-
cate human judgment-to randomize completely, as Harcourt seems
to suggest.
Randomization is also likely inefficient. While efficiency itself
may not be a goal of the criminal justice system, large inefficiencies
waste sufficient resources to call into question the ability to implement
our true goals, such as minimizing crime.
55 HARCOuRT, supra note 4, at 239.
56 Harcourt has a working paper that provides more details but still does not grapple
with the basic issue of where and when randomization should occur. See Bernard E. Har-
court, Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 318 (2d series), Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law and Legal The-
ory, Working Paper No. 143, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=948774.
57 Many scholars have argued persuasively that the federal sentencing guidelines have
displaced, rather than eliminated, discretion in sentencing. See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel & Ste-
phen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining
Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501 (1992) (examining the
role of discretion under the federal sentencing guidelines). This changed balance of dis-
cretionary power may change again because of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
which held that the federal sentencing guidelines were discretionary rather than
mandatory.
58 See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 57, at 501-02.
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Harcourt also fails to engage straightforward questions about the
constitutionality of randomization. While Harcourt seems more inter-
ested in morality than constitutionality, some discussion of the consti-
tutionality of random policing or punishment under the Fourth and
Eighth Amendments is necessary if Harcourt's proposal is to be more
than academic. A constitutional search requires at least some level of
suspicion 59 or the consent of the searched.60 Humanjudgment is nec-
essary to satisfy either of these requirements. In the Eighth Amend-
ment context, the Supreme Court has been hostile to "arbitrary and
capricious" application of punishment.61 Randomly punishing indi-
viduals certainly violates the core notion of fairness that Harcourt crit-
icizes society for ignoring in its hunger for prediction.
I do not intend these criticisms to detract from the significant
contribution that Against Prediction makes in demonstrating the seri-
ous flaws of current actuarial methods and highlighting the dangers
of relying too heavily on these methods to determine just outcomes.
Indeed, as I note above, Harcourt's solution to the pitfalls of predic-
tion is one small portion of Against Prediction.
I also sympathize with Harcourt's distrust of human judgment in
criminal justice. I agree that the U.S. criminal justice system is, in
some fundamental way, broken. Between 1985 and 2005, the United
States doubled its incarceration rate, reaching a level that may not be
sustainable. 62 The direct cost of incarceration has become enor-
mous; 63 indirect costs to families and entire communities are even
59 The Fourth Amendment requires all searches and seizures to be reasonable. See
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (elaborating
on the level of suspicion required to constitute probable cause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
8-9, 28-31 (1968) (requiring reasonable suspicion for even minimally intrusive stops and
frisks).
60 SeeSchneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("[O]ne of the specifically
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a
search that is conducted pursuant to consent.").
61 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
62 The incarceration rate increased from 313 to 738 prisoners per 100,000 residents
in the two decades since 1985. DARRELL K. GILLIARD & ALLENJ. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISON ANDJAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 1996, at 2 tbl.1 (1997), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjimy96.pdf (calculating an incarceration rate in 1985 of
313 prisoners per 100,000 residents); PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005, at 2 tbl.1 (2006), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim05.pdf (calculating an incarceration rate in
2005 of 738 prisoners per 100,000 residents).
63 The United States spent $167 billion for "police protection, corrections, and judi-
cial and legal activities" related to criminal justice in 2001. LYNN BAUER & STEVEN D.
OWENS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2001, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
jeeus0l.pdf.
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larger.64 And while crime rates have also decreased 65 (likely due in
part to the mass incarceration of criminals),66 it is not at all clear that
this was the most effective use of the billions of dollars spent.
Finally, I also agree with Harcourt's unstated assumption that the
misuse of actuarial methods played a large part in the failure de-
scribed above. But, unlike Harcourt, I do not believe that the solution
is to remove human judgment from the process; even if that were pos-
sible, people rather than methods are responsible for the current state
of our criminal justice system. Human judgment has broken our
criminal justice system, but I cannot agree that we must eliminate
human judgment to fix it. To the contrary, human judgment is neces-
sary if society is to incorporate its core moral values into the criminal
justice system.
III
MIXING METHODS: AN ALTERNATE SOLUTION
Harcourt's criticisms of prediction expose serious flaws with the
use of prediction in the criminal justice system. Depending on elastic-
ities, prediction may be quite inefficient. Unless individuals using cur-
rent data resources recognize that the data are seriously biased, the
ratchet effect will continue to plague prediction. And society must
remain vigilant and not allow actuarial methods to define just
punishment.
As I discuss above, Harcourt's randomization solution is not prac-
tical because it gives up too much. In recognizing the flaws in human
judgment, randomization attempts to remove judgment from deci-
sions. Harcourt essentially argues that we must abandon human judg-
ment in favor of randomization simply because judgment cannot be
perfect.
This is not to say that randomization should play no role at all in
the criminal justice system. As a statistician, I enthusiastically support
randomization. Randomized experiments are the "gold standard" in
empirical methods to answer interesting and important questions.
But human judgment is fundamental to justice as well. Fairness and
compassion are both necessary in a criminal justice system but cannot
be programmed into a machine. They require that people, with all
their biases, make decisions regarding punishment and policing.
64 See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRIS-
ONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (examining the negative familial,
racial, and communal effects of policies that allow for mass incarceration).
65 See SHANNAN M. CATALANO, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICrIMIZATION,
2005, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv05.pdf (estimat-
ing that violent crime rates decreased 58% between 1993 and 2005).
66 See Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Ex-
plain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18J. EcoN. PERSP. 163, 177-79 (2004).
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That said, randomization does have a place in the criminal justice
system. Limited use of randomization and experiments will teach us
significantly more about how the criminal justice system currently
works and greatly improve our use of actuarial methods. In fact, lim-
ited use of randomization can significantly reduce the impact of the
three problems that Harcourt illustrates in Against Prediction. Each
problem is based on reliance on incomplete or biased data.
Randomization creates unbiased data and, if done thoughtfully, can
also produce the information that police, parole boards, and others
need to avoid the pitfalls of prediction that Harcourt outlines.
An example using racial profiling in highway stops and searches
helps illustrate how randomization can be effective. One could ran-
domize highway police stops on certain days. (One could even ran-
domize which days are "profiling" days and which days are "random"
days.) On "profiling" days, the highway police would use actuarial
methods to decide whom to stop and search; on "random" days, the
highway police could randomly decide whom to stop and ask for per-
mission to search from the near-complete sample of people who
speed on the highway67-they would decide whether to stop an indi-
vidual based on the flip of a weighted coin. 68 This proposal is not
perfect randomization-the police cannot search without motorists'
consent-but very few motorists, including those carrying drugs, re-
fuse.69 This scenario limits human judgment because police officers
do not determine whether probable cause to search a vehicle exists or
which motorists are most likely to carry drugs. The data collected
from this experiment would correctly depict crime rates among and
between different groups. These data would also accurately assess
whether profiling is more efficient than randomization. Most impor-
tantly, these data would accurately evaluate how individual motorists
change their behavior in response to changing police tactics-the
data would correctly measure the criminal-offending elasticities of dif-
ferent groups of offenders. Because the data accurately depict crime
rates across groups, they will fix the ratchet effect, as police will have
an unbiased sample of data from which to create a new profile. Im-
plementing this new profile would provide even more data about how
motorists respond to changing police strategies. In addition, the data
67 Almost all motorists speed. See Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work:
Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REv. 651, 664 (2002) (re-
porting data from a study of speeding on Maryland highways). Even if a driver does not
speed, there are myriad other violations that police may have probable cause to believe
occurred. See Gary Webb, DWB, EsQuiRE, Apr. 1999, at 118, 123 (quoting a California
highway patrol officer stating, "The vehicle code gives me fifteen hundred reasons to pull
you over ....").
68 The weighting of the coin would make the overall probability of being stopped
much smaller than fifty percent.
69 See Gross & Barnes, supra note 67, at 675.
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gathered from this ongoing experiment will eliminate the efficiency
problem because it will make clear whether crime is increasing due to
profiling based on elasticities.
In fact, in the racial profiling context, a little randomization
works better than complete randomization. Complete randomization
does not provide ongoing data about how individual motorists re-
spond to changing police strategies, whereas switching between
randomization and profiling does. Complete randomization also may
be inefficient, depending on elasticities and differences in absolute
levels of criminal activity, but limiting the use of randomization also
limits this inefficiency. This is not to say that partial randomization is
the cure for all the pitfalls of prediction. The data may still be biased
by selection occurring during the experiment, such as the decision to
refuse a search or to obey every traffic law. This experiment does not
clarify whether limited randomization would work in other predictive
contexts within the criminal justice system. Profiling may be unique
given that one can rely on speeding norms to minimize bias in the
sample via randomization. But, at least in this context, limited
randomization is a practical and useful improvement over current
methods.
CONCLUSION
Bernard Harcourt's Against Prediction is a significant contribution
to the debate regarding the proper role of actuarial methods in the
criminal justice system. His critiques of the use of actuarial methods
provide key insights to the misuse of actuarial methods and the conse-
quences of relying too heavily on prediction. Although Harcourt pro-
vides an abbreviated outline of a solution, no solution can remove
Harcourt's true enemy: the flawedjudgment that allows poor actuarial
methods to control our decisions about just punishment. Harcourt's
provocative solution-to do away with all actuarial methods and rely
solely on randomization-is an innovative, if impossible, answer to the
key problems of prediction that he illuminates. While this solution
falls short of its full promise, the concept of randomization is a very
useful one, which if judiciously used, can alleviate the pitfalls of
prediction.
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